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"The More of Them Are Killed the Better"
RACIAL IDENTIlY AND NONCOMBATANT IMMUNIlY IN CIVIL WAR
NEW MEXICO

James M. Bartek

" Excuse my bad writing for I am in a very great hurry," Texas artillerist
Frank Starr apologized to his father in early October 1861. "It is
rumored that we march next monday-where to I do not know but I suspect
towards New Mexico." Penned with palpable anticipation from Camp Sibley
outside San Antonio, Texas, this briefletter presaged a significant expansion
of the American Civil War, which most Americans assumed would last no
more than a few weeks when the conflict started in April. Stalemated in the
East, some Southerners looked to the Southwest for the decisive encounter
that would secure the independence of their country, the Confederate States
(
of America. New Mexico Territory, which included all of present-day Arizona, seemed ripe for the taking. The subsequent campaign to expand the
Confederate empire, however, did not go unchallenged. Union volunteers
blunted the rebel advance at the Battle of Glorieta Pass in March 1862 and
eventually secured the territory for the United States.'
Unsurprisingly, the conduct, if not overall strategy, of the New Mexico
campaign seemed to mirror in large degree the events taking place in the
East: Americans fought Americans and make-shift hospitals overflowed with
casualties. Historians even retroactively dubbed the single climactic encounter at Glorieta Pass the "Gettysburg of the West." As in the East, the ethos of
"civilized" warfare among the combatants tempered the ferocious fighting:

James M. Bartek is an instructor of History at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, where
he received his PhD in 2010. His dissertation, "The Rhetoric ofDestruetion," explores the issues
of race and noncombatant immunity during the American Civil War.
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Prisoners of war were granted quarter, the wounded were tended, and soldiers
often ruminated on the inherent humanity of their enemy. At least in one
glaring regard, however, the New Mexico campaign differed drastically from
the events unraveling on the other side of the Mississippi River. A policy of
military restraint toward civilians, however tenuous, continued to hold sway
in the East, at least through 1863. Anglo American soldiers encountering
enemy civilians tended to adopt, with important exceptions, relatively mild
retributive policies. Despite inflammatory rhetoric demanding that the
enemy's country be laid to waste, Union and Confederate soldiers stopped
far short of total devastation. In New Mexico and Arizona, however, Union
and rebel troops encountered not Anglo Americans but Hispanic Americans
among the civilian population. Both armies, in effect, became occupiers of
a "foreign" land, and the multiracial Southwest ultimately exposed the shallowness of Anglo notions toward "civilized" warfare. Uniformly denounced
as treacherous "greasers" or "indolent" peons, native New Mexicans fell
prey to Northern and Southern volunteers who plundered and destroyed
with abandon. Far from pillaging for the sake of pillaging, volunteers were
in fact making a profound social statement concerning the values and ideals
of mid-nineteenth-century Anglo America.'

The Southwest in 1860
In 1860 the preponderance of U.S. Army regulars were scattered in companysized detachments throughout the West. Chasing down Indians only occasionally interrupted an otherwise monotonous life of road building, fort
construction, and parade drill. The secession crisis demanded soldiers play
a much greater role. In response to the rebellion, the federal government
transferred a significant number of troops to the East. Some western forts were
completely abandoned while others were handed to hastily raised volunteer
units. The inevitable confusion left the remaining Union defenders vulnerable. With all eyes fixed on eastern battlefields, federal help would not be
forthcoming should a crisis arise.
Some Southerners, Texans especially, deemed New Mexico Territory too
great a prize not to exploit. Annexing the territory would bring the South one
step closer to becoming a continental nation. With New Mexico secured, so
went the conventional wisdom, it was only a matter of time before California
threw in its lot with the Confederacy- significant discontent with the federal
government among Californians lent plausibility to the scenario-or was
conquered in turn. Already stretched thin on the Atlantic Coast, the Union
Navy would be hard pressed to blockade Pacific ports effectively, leaving the
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South with virtually unfettered access to international trade. The capture of
southwestern gold and silver mines would guarantee a steady flow of precious
metals at the expense of the Union war effort. Most importantly, significant
gains in the Southwest might win the foreign recognition Southern leaders so
desperately sought. If the plans seemed grandiose, they at least corresponded
with an overall Confederate national strategy of winning independence from
the Union. A few ambitious Texans considered the conquest of New Mexico
merely the first stage of an even grander design: the creation of a Confederate
empire in Latin America.'
The philosophy of expansionism was a potent force during the 185os. As
the rancor of sectional politics increased, Texans' historical yearning for
territorial aggrandizement neatly coalesced with a more general Southern
desire to expand the institution of slavery. For many proponents, expansion
seemed the only way to ensure slavery's survival. The drive for the expansion of slavery gained urgency after the election of 1860, which brought to
power a Republican administration that advocated immediate containment
as a road to eventual abolition. If safeguarding slavery required expansion,
federal opposition to slavery's extension required southern secession. In
October 1860, the Weekly Sun in Vicksburg, Mississippi, insisted, "The
Southern States once constituted as an independent Republic, the acquisition of Mexico, Central America, San[to] Domingo, and other West [Indies]
Islands would follow as a direct and necessary result." The newspaper's
editor concluded that the Gulf of Mexico could be made into a "Southern
lake." For Texas nationalists, the prospect of unhindered expansion was
equally attractive, although advocates invariably couched the benefits in
more provincial terms. "We must have [the northern Mexican states of]
Sonora and Chihuahua," declared James Reily, a future officer for a Texas
volunteer regiment. "With Sonora and Chihuahua we gain Southern California, and by a railroad to Cuaymasrender our State of Texas the great
highway of nations." The improbability of the success of such schemes did
not prevent them from gaining widespread acceptance, and the possible
extent of southern power appeared limited only by the imagination. Not
by accident, the Knights of the Golden Circle, a secretive organization
dedicated to the creation of a slavery empire in Latin America, found its
greatest support in Texas."
The desire to expand slavery to the west and south was simply one
component of the much larger phenomenon of manifest destiny. Hardly
limited to Southerners, the belief that American values and institutions
were destined to spread across the North American continent and perhaps
the hemisphere had been a driving force since the United States' inception.
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Americans touted their country as a paragon of republicanism or democracy
and an exemplar of freedom. Other peoples, they assumed, would only
benefit from American tutelage. But as might be expected of a country that
simultaneously espoused the equality of man and tolerated racial slavery, its
philosophy about its continental destiny was rife with tensions and contradictions. Civilizing the savage and enlightening the ignorant too often equated
with intolerance, subjugation, or extermination.
Nor would those peoples subjected to American "enlightenment" have
much choice in the matter. The United States ruthlessly demonstrated what
manifest destiny meant in regard to Mexicans in 1846. Upon seizing all of
northern Mexico, Americans determined that uplifting such an "indolent"
people might not be possible or even desirable. In 1848, Lorenzo Thomas,
a U.S.-Mexico War officer and future Civil War general, surmised, "The
people are addicted to gaming, & robbing is common to the mass-men
take office here for plunder, so that all have become corrupt, and it is very
evident that they are incapable of good government." He continued: "It
is perfectly evident to me that this people are doomed to pass off, and at
no distant day.... The hardy and nobler northerners are destined ... to
over run [sic] this section of North America, even if peace now should be
made." Thomas spoke not of enlightenment but of indefinable extinction.
An inferior and feeble "race" (Mexicans in this case) would simply "pass
off," leaving the country in the hands of "hardy" Anglo Americans. Immutable racial flaws made Mexicans incapable of improvement and therefore
unworthy of the land they possessed. This rationale, popularized during
the Texas Revolution in the mid-idjos, justified an aggressive war for territory in 1846, underpinned racially motivated atrocities against Mexican
civilians, and later served as the basis for relegating Mexican Americans to
second-class citizenship. Above all, then, manifest destiny stood for racial
exploitation and Anglo supremacy.'
The hostilities between Texas and Mexico that began in the mid-1830s
and those that started between the United States and Mexico a decade later
left Anglo Americans with a decidedly negative image of their southern
neighbors. The Civil War reinforced that view. Union volunteers, dismissive
of native New Mexicans, often treated them more as a hostile population
than as American citizens. Hispanic peoples had not "passed off" as predicted
but neither had they been fully assimilated into American society. Indeed,
for many soldiers, New Mexico appeared much too similar to Old Mexico.
Meanwhile, Confederate volunteers, with Texans in the vanguard, clearly
meant to assume the mantle of expansionism that had seemingly been cast
aside by the United States during the 185os.6
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A Degraded and Indolent Race
Although preoccupied with the rigors of an active campaign, the volunteers
who descended on the Southwest in 1861 and 1862 still found ample time to
ruminate on the Hispanic people they encountered. Whatever their political,
social, or ideological differences, Northern and Southern soldiers found common ground in their estimation of Mexican Americans, looking upon them
with condescension or outright contempt. Volunteers scrutinized every aspect
of Hispanic culture and often concluded that it was not much of a culture
at all. That opinion heavily influenced their subsequent treatment of their
Hispanic hosts. California volunteer Eli W. Hazen, for example, managed
to dismiss the entire territory of Arizona as a place where "every bush had a
thorn, every toad a horn, and every woman was a whore and every man was a
lying Gambling horse thief." Santa Fe, the capital of New Mexico, particularly
struck Coloradoan Alonzo F. Ickis as an especially unsavory place. "[F]ound
it a poor town of 10,000 Greasers," he wrote his brother. "The town supports
one Presbyterian and two Catholic churches but I do not think they exercise
any goodinfluence over the people. Santa Fe is one grande (excuse the expression) brothel." Confederates were no more forgiving. "From the day we left
Mesilla all eyes were strained to get a peep at Santa Fe," wrote a Texan in
early 1862. "Imagine our astonishment! Instead of a fine city, a group of mud
cabins-instead of neatness and beauty, loathsomeness and filth,-instead
of intelligence, the grossest ignorance. What a capital for a great nation.'?
Such opinions were widespread, and those who proffered them expressed
certainty that the shortcomings they observed had everything to do with
a flawed New Mexican character. While Confederate brigadier general
Henry H. Sibley outfitted his Army of New Mexico near San Antonio in
September 1861, many of his volunteers, especially the East Texans, used
the opportunity to explore the historic town. Regardless of its cosmopolitan
attractions, Pvt. W. Randolph Howell of the Fourth Texas Mounted Volunteers thought San Antonio suffered from a major drawback: "It has the
worst mixed population I have ever seen -Americans, Germans, Mexicans,
and any sort of people you want to see." He continued, "They look like
a greatly degraded people, the most of them - The Mexicans especially."
The notion of Mexican degradation-that people of Mexican descent were
somehow tainted, corrupted, or impure-was a common pronouncement.
The source of that degradation was racial miscegenation. Ovando J. Hollister,
a volunteer in the First Colorado Infantry, rather disdainfully hypothesized
that New Mexicans represented "a cross between the Spaniard and Indian,
though the latter greatly predominates."
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Whatever their racial origins-and soldiers speculated voluminously
on this point-Mexicans clearly stood apart from the Anglo race. Custom,
culture, religion, language, and especially skin color and physical appearance
branded them as different and inferior. "Mexicans," declared Texan Ebenezer
Hanna, "have a certain degree of civilization in their manners and appearance
which does not exceed the common class of the half-civilized Indians of the
Indian Territory." Labeling New Mexicans as half-civilized, however, was not
meant to explain their condition. The expression merely served as another
way to describe their situation, to accentuate and exaggerate the differences
between Anglo and Mexican Americans. Coloradoan George Aux made
abundantly clear that soldiers considered the chasm virtually unbridgeable.
After a white lieutenant of a New Mexican regiment ordered several members
of the First Colorado tied to a wagon for killing an ox, Aux declared that
inflicting such punishment on American volunteers was unacceptable. "If I
had been one that ... was tied, the Liut would not tied a nother after he had
tied me," he boldly informed his wife. "He is Leut of a Mexican Colmpany]
and he thinks that we ar [sic] all greesers [sic], I think he will soon find out
that we ar not greesers but whit [sic] men."?
As some of the previous comments suggest, one of the most enduring and
prominent images clouding the Anglo mind in regards to Mexicans was that
of the "indolent" Mexican, an obvious counterpoint to the "industrious"
American. Accusations of laziness often accompanied a litany of other
condemnations, but it seemed a principle cause of Mexican backwardness.
Hollister could only attribute the poverty he saw before him to intentional
Mexican sloth. "One would almost think they scrimped themselves to save
work," he insisted. "They seem destitute of ambition or enterprise. Laziness
is their most marked characteristic." Yet even the laziest of people require
some means of survival, and according to volunteers, the primary vocations of
most New Mexicans were gambling, cheating, thievery, or outright banditry.
Soldiers contended that ignorance also seemed to be a pervasive problem.
For some, it appeared that Mexicans lacked the mental capacity to appreciate
fully their own plight-a circumstance often attributed to a domineering
and oppressive Catholic Church. To Anglo volunteers, the prevalence of
Catholicism among native New Mexicans was another peculiarity that
marked them as a lesser people. They derided the Catholic faith witnessed
in New Mexico as mere "superstition" and its practitioners as "heathens."?
Regardless of the pervasiveness of the church in Hispanic culture, Anglo
soldiers still discerned a great deal of immorality among New Mexicans, an
accusation common to racialist thought. Sexual promiscuity, in particular,
seemed endemic. "This is a decidedly fast town by moonlight," Ickis
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complained of Santa Fe. "Licentiousness is deemed a virtue and but few
Mexicans are without sexual disease in some form. I believe there are but
few but what inherit disease." The Anglo charge of moral failings among
New Mexicans hardly originated with objective observation but rather
stemmed from a Mexican culture that clashed with soldiers' own Victorian
sensibilities. As a way to distance themselves further from a half-civilized
people, Americans passed moral judgments on what were in fact nonmoral
situations (such as public bathing), imputing to Mexicans an immorality and
lewdness that bolstered their own sense of virtue. The stereotypical image
of the lascivious Mexican woman, a construction of the prudish American
mind, became the stuff of legend. That stereotype was at once alluring and
repulsive, romantic and erotic."
Despite this ambivalence, or perhaps because of it, encounters between
soldiers and local women occurred regularly, according to the soldiers who
described them. One Confederate insisted that Texans never "appropriated"
a woman without her consent. Union sources, too, admitted to the intimate
relationships that developed between soldiers and senoritas. Nevertheless,
no matter how cordial or consensual the relationship, soldiers tended
to objectify in sexual terms the women whom they encountered. While
Coloradoans denounced the entire territory as a "grande brothel," Texans
often "appropriated" women as they would a mule. Union and Confederate
soldiers who left written records almost always.viewed them as objects of
sexual revulsion or desire, condemning them as sexual deviants or coveting
them as spoils of war."
This attitude produced predictable results.A Unionist native New Mexican
noted with despair the rowdy conduct of Confederate colonel John Baylor'S
men soon after they entered the territory in August 1861 and "hoisted their dirty
banner." Although the Texans guaranteed that the citizens would be safe, the
New Mexican discovered thatthe pledge was "granted, in word only, because
the same night all of their creatures went around forcing open doors, raping
women and girls, and the least they have done to us is plunder us until we
have nothing left." His testimony is notable, not least because Baylor's men
have heretofore enjoyed a reputation for orderly conduct. Similar charges
also arose against both Sibley's Texans and the Union volunteers who expelled them, suggesting a pattern of sexual abuse and violence against New
Mexicans. Comparable reports of Confederate and Union forces (excluding
guerrilla units) preying on Anglo women were practically nonexistent. Gender
norms among Anglo soldiers in the Southwest varied little, particularly in
regard to properly conducting themselves toward women, but their behavior
was complicated by the issue of race. In the eyes of white troops, not only did
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Mexican women flout acceptable behavior with their alleged licentiousness,
but their status as the non-Anglo "other" undermined any defenses that their
gender might have afforded them. Volunteers, especially Texans, entered New
Mexico under the banner of manifest destiny, carrying with them a sense of
entitlement to the land and its resources. Many Union and Confederate soldiers
viewed the appropriation of Mexican women as their racial prerogative."
Just as Mexican women appeared to lack some crucial element of femininity, so too did Mexican men seem to be missing an integral component
of masculinity. Charges of cowardice and rank opportunism went hand in
hand. As early as August 1861, Union colonel Edward R. S. Canby doubted
that native New Mexicans would assist their country in defending the territory. One of his majors, William Chapman, complained that they were
"more afraid of the Texans than they are of death, and in case of an attack
... I cannot rely upon them." Union volunteers who might have expected
New Mexican help to repel the Confederate invasion quickly came to the
same conclusions. The people simply lacked the fortitude necessary to protect
themselves. As a detachment of the First Colorado Volunteers approached
one village, Hollister observed panicked residents who could not distinguish
whether the impending force represented friend or foe. "We struck the
river just below an outlandish Mexican town; whose inhabitants fled, like
any other cattle, and hid in the corn," Hollister recorded with contempt.
Confederate soldiers disparaged Hispanic New Mexicans at an even higher
pitch. One volunteer, in a letter to a local paper, warned his countrymen
against complacency in the coming conflict: "Texans may have easily conquered the Mexican and Savage foe by their dauntless valor, but the case is
far different now." Although the Mexican resistance might be easily brushed
aside, conquering New Mexico would require the besting of a much more
formidable white American foe. One participant noted, for example, "our
enemy has the same Norman blood-greatly exceeds us in numbers, and
will be thoroughly disciplined before giving us battle.'?'
Treachery, not bravery, represented the flip side to Mexican cowardice.
For Union volunteers, treachery usually signified nothing more than banditry.
For Confederate Texans, who used the term with far more frequency than
Union volunteers did, it was a pejorative heavy with historical baggage. The
phrase "treacherous Mexican" conjured images not of simple banditry but of
past cruelties inflicted by Mexicans upon Texans, including the Alamo, the
Goliad massacre, the debacle and torment of the Texas Santa Fe Expedition
of 1841, and the Cortina Wars in 1859 and 1861. The image was synonymous
with barbarity, inhumanity, and murder, all threats to the very foundations
of Anglo Texan civilization.
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The symbolism of the Texas Revolution and the specter of Mexican
treachery remained powerful motivational forces for Sibley's volunteers. As
they gathered in San Antonio, the launching point of the campaign, they
acknowledged the historical significance of the place. "[We] pitch our Camp
on Alamo Plaza," noted Pvt. William W. Heartsill, "and immediately in front
of the old Alamo Church, where Davy Crockett and his brave comrades were
inhumanly butchered by the Greasers." The Texas volunteers' discovery of
Union authorities in New Mexico recruiting native Hispanics raised their ire
to new heights. "We did not care to fight the New Mexicans," one participant
insisted, "but they have dared to raise their arms against us.... Those who
have read the stirring history ... can easily appreciate the feelings of Texans
who find the same men in arms against us. They will call upon their patron
saints in piteous tones to save them from the just indignation and vengeance
of the 'Tejanos.'" Unlike Union volunteers, Confederate Texans clearly had
a score to settle with Nuevomexicanos. Although they did not go into battle
crying "Remember the Alamo," they clearly recalled that their ancestors had
done so. Vengeance, then, served as a significant force in their actions toward
New Mexicans."
Obviously, many Anglo soldiers considered New Mexicans a degenerate
people beyond redemption. Not only did they seem culturally and racially
inferior, but their existence posed an obstacle to the march of Anglo American
progress. "This valley if settled by whitecitizens. . . would be one of the richest
Valleys in the world," declared Texan Frank Starr, "but if it remains peopled
by this degraded race of Mexicans and Indians, it will forever remain in its
present condition." For those soldiers holding such a belief, the next logical
step was the dislocation, subjugation, or even eradication of the Mexican
American population. At the least sign of resistance, Anglo volunteers could
completely dehumanize New Mexicans as "brute beasts" or "treacherous"
cowards, transforming even a minor annoyance into a virulent threat. When
Coloradoans apprehended a New Mexican who they suspected of spying for
Sibley's Confederates, an incredulous Ickis reported: "He is a greaser and
'plays insane.' Perhaps stretching his neck would have the desired effect.

It would be no sin if he was an insane Mexican for the more of them are
killed the better the country is off." Too often, however, what volunteers
considered "resistance" was simple survival to New Mexicans. With no
profound attachment to the United States and a bitter enmity toward Texas,
New Mexicans rightly feared two unsympathetic Anglo armies flowing into
the territory, consuming scarce supplies, impressing livestock, and creating the inevitable hardships that always followed in the wake of a military
carnpaign.v
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The New Mexico Campaign
When General Sibley petitioned Confederate president Jefferson Davis for
permission to undertake the campaign in New Mexico, he predictably put
the best possible face on the venture to assuage any doubts his commanderin-chief might hold. Sibley insisted that the federal army was in disarray and
that the region was filled with Anglo secessionists who would readily support
the Confederate cause. He even suggested that the Hispanic population would
gladly contribute provisions and recruits to the southern effort. Furthermore,
the conquest of the Southwest could be completed with minimal expense to
the Confederate government. The Texas army, Sibley noted, could simply
live off the land and the supplies captured from Union forces. The promise
of great success with little sacrifice was too good to be true, but it did not
prevent Davis from granting Sibley a commission as brigadier general and
sanctioning the campaign."
While Sibley trusted that New Mexicans would support the Confederate
cause, Union leaders doubted that Hispanics would enthusiastically rally
behind the United States. In June 1861, reports of a planned New Mexican
uprising specifically against Anglos reached U.S. authorities. Although the
rumored date for the rising passed uneventfully, the credence given to such
stories betrayed the uncertainty of federal officials. "The Mexican people
have no affection for the institutions of the United States," Canby warned
in January 1862. "They have a strong, but hitherto restrained, hatred for the
Americans as a race, and there are not wanting persons who ... have secretly
but industriously endeavored to keep alive all the elements of discontent and
fan them into flames." Canby considered Mexicans to be an "ignorant" and
"impulsive" people prone to the machinations of Southern sympathizers,
but he failed to take into account that a long-standing hatred of Texans far
outweighed whatever general ill will they harbored against Americans. Just as
Texans bitterly recalled past examples of Mexican treachery, New Mexicans
recollected instances ofTexan "barbarity."The Santa Fe and Mier expeditions
of 1841 and 1842, in particular, remained effective rallying points. Federal
territorial authorities, who urged men to volunteer not out of loyalty to the
United States but to protect their families from the dreaded "Tejanos," used
the image of the savage Texan with great success. IS
Most New Mexicans made no secret of their hatred for Texans, and if Sibley
genuinely expected the population to support his cause, he must have been
disappointed. Although a few native New Mexicans joined Colonel Baylor's
command early on, some twenty-eight hundred Hispanic men had enlisted
in Union regiments by February 1862. Whatever Sibley wished to believe,
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the decision of a Southern-sympathizing oligarchy of ricos (rich landowners)
and Anglos to create a Confederate Territory of Arizona hardly represented
the majority will. The failure to recognize that the conquest of New Mexico
also required a conquest of hearts and minds was a colossal mistake, one
compounded by yet another false assumption: contrary to Sibley's assertion,
it would be extraordinarily difficult for an army to live off the land in the
arid Southwest. Given the low regard in which most Confederates held
New Mexicans, they probably did not possess the wherewithal or patience
to convince the Hispanic population of their struggle's righteousness. The
Confederates ruthlessly foraging with impunity virtually guaranteed that New
Mexicans would fight against them rather than rally around their cause.'?
Nevertheless, Sibley appeared to start his campaign in the right direction.

In December 1861, shortly after his army crossed into New Mexico, he issued
and published in English and Spanish a seemingly magnanimous decree to
the people of the territory. The Confederate Army of New Mexico, he assured
the native population, came not as conquerors but as "liberators" who sought
to relieve the people of the "iniquitous exactions" of the U.S. government.
Had Confederates acted in the spirit of the proclamation, they might have
wooed Hispanic support to their cause. The reality of Confederate policies
was closer to occupation than liberation. Although Sibley promised salvation
from a "military despotism," Confederate-occupied portions of the territory
remained under martial law during his campaign, citizens were forced to
swear oaths of loyalty to the Confederacy, and the "iniquitous exactions" of
the United States were replaced by Confederate equivalents in the form of
confiscations. He pledged to protect private property, but Sibley also made
clear that New Mexicans had to make available on the "open market" the
forage and supplies necessary to sustain his army and accept payment for the
goods in Confederate dollars at "fair prices." He promised stiff penalties for
subterfuge: "If destroyed or removed to prevent me from availing myself of
them, those who so co-operate with our enemies will be treated accordingly,
and must prepare to share their fate." Byfailing to distinguish between civilians
who concealed supplies in order to aid the Union and those who did so to
prevent starvation, Sibley turned nearly everyone in the territory against the

Confederacy."
From the time they entered the territory, Sibley's men acted as a hostile
army in a foreign country. Categorizing New Mexicans as an inferior people
helped justifytaking food, animals, clothing, and other property. One Union
informer thought the Texans resembled a mob more than a disciplined army:
"They have acted about El Paso in such a manner as to enrage the whole
community against them. All Mexicans are down on them, and they will
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find very little sympathy when they return.... Blankets, onions, wine, and
everything they can lay their hands on they carry off." Nor was property their
sole interest, as the actions of one hapless volunteer killed by enraged citizens
demonstrated. "The [authorities] said that [he] had assaulted or insulted a
Mexican woman in her house, that she ran out of the house screaming,"
reported a doubting comrade. The episode did little to improve relations
between Texans and New Mexicans. With great effort, Confederate officers
convinced their men not to burn the town in retribution for their compatriot's
murder. The El Paso informer corroborated reports of unruly behavior: "The
officers have no control over them, and they do just as they please, and you
know what men off a long trip please to do; females neither in nor out of
their houses are safe."2!
Confederate brigandage in El Paso was but a prelude. Around Mesilla,
New Mexico, individual soldiers, enforcing their "fair price," stole what they
needed, grazed their horses in New Mexican wheat fields, and cheated
vendors already reluctant to accept Confederate money. Confederate
depredations in southern New Mexico put local residents on guard
everywhere, and supplying the army turned increasingly difficult for Sibley's
quartermaster and commissary officers. Civilians who initially welcomed
the opportunity to sell what little surplus they possessed now shied away,
unwilling to have their goods stolen, confiscated, or paid for in worthless
scrip. Frustrated Texans, who assumed New Mexicans would provide for
them, forcibly quartered themselves in houses of reluctant hosts and coerced
village officials into providing basic commodities such as firewood. Many
Texans believed - correctly in part - that New Mexicans concealed their goods
at the behest of federal authorities, but the more immediate worry of the local
population was protecting itself and private property from the ravenous horde
of Confederates. William Davidson of the Fourth Texas recalled: "My special
duty was to ... scour the country for food and provisions.... The enemy
moved everything to eat out of the country and persuaded the Mexicans to hide
their corn and wheat and drive their cattle and sheep beyond our reach." In a
period of three days, Davidson managed to secure over one hundred bushels
of wheat, two hundred bushels of corn, and several mules. Such excursions
continued as the Army ofNew Mexico wound itsway up the Rio Grande Valley.
Confederates confiscated goods in excess of three thousand dollars, teams of
oxen, and a sizable flock of sheep near Valverde, New Mexico. At Santa Fe,
they seized thirty thousand dollars worth of "government property" as residents
scrambled to conceal personal possessions."
Yet, hunger constantly plagued Confederate forces no matter how
efficiently they foraged. With the loss of their supply train at the Battle
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of Glorieta Pass, Confederates faced the unpleasant choice of starving or
retreating. In the end, they did both. "Our army cannot be subsisted here,"
admitted a Texan following the disaster, "and the enemy has only to wait
a few weeks till famine runs us out, to possess the country quietly again."
Sibley's plan to support his army through foraging proved both impractical
and counterproductive. Colonel Baylor remarked that the actions of Sibley's
troops destroyed the "good will" of the people. Other observers agreed. A
resident of Mesilla reported, "[T]he Southern soldiers ... have consumed
and destroyed everything, even to the growing crops. The people here are
with their eyes open toward the North, in the hope of being relieved from
the devastation of these locusts.'?'
Texans, in turn, blamed "ignorant" New Mexicans for sabotaging the
campaign, failing to acknowledge that their own abuses attributed much
to the New Mexicans' passive and active resistance. Starr insisted that New
Mexicans "looked upon us with fear, having been told that we had come to
revenge the treatment of the Santa Fe Prisoners [of 1841]. They will favor the
most powerful side, and all the time that we were there they doubted our
ability to hold the country, and took every opportunity to keep the enemy
well informed ofour proceedings and movements." Sibley, too, was widely
censured for the failure; he spent much of the campaign confined to an
ambulance- drunk, according to rumors. As the commanding general, Sibley
could escape the wrath of his soldiers, but New Mexican civilians could not.
"My troops," he keenly observed, "have manifested a dogged irreconcilable
detestation of the Country and the People."?'
Ragged and hungry, harried by Union forces, and disgusted with officers
and civilians alike, the disillusioned volunteers eventually succumbed to
panic, and the Confederate retreat to Mesilla in spring 1862 devolved into a
nightmare of deprivation and desperation. The army had stripped the valley
of food and supplies during the northern advance, leaving little to sustain
them on the return trip. Still, the Texans foraged with zeal. Confederate troops
confiscated livestock, wheat, corn, whiskey, tobacco, and even strings of red
chile peppers. A resident of Las Lunas, New Mexico, reported that soldiers
stole four thousand dollars worth of his property. Toward the end, the army
practically dissolved into a mob. An EI Paso merchant who observed the
withdrawal described its utter defeat and desperation to General Canby: "The
Second Regiment [Colonel Thomas Green's Fifth Texas Mounted Rifles] is
scattered in parties of 15 or 20 along the road ... committing outrages upon
the inhabitants they meet [on] the highway. They are almost on the point
of starvation .... The Mexican population are much enraged against them
on account of their rude treatment." The Army of New Mexico cleaned out
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the Mesilla Valley so thoroughly that the merchant feared that famine might
stalk the people."
Emboldened by the Confederate defeat and retreat, New Mexicans
refused all Confederate scrip and demanded hard currency. Texans' foraging
expeditions sometimes led to bloody clashes that aggravated the animosity
between Texans and New Mexicans. If volunteers still subscribed to the
idea of Mexican "indifference," that belief was rudely dispelled. In April a
citizen militia surrounded the camp of a dozen Texans near the village of Los
Padillas. Taken by surprise, one ofthe volunteers dropped his pistols to signal
his surrender. The militiamen ignored the gesture and shot him through the
chest. In the ensuing firefight, another Texan was killed and one wounded.
Word of the encounter enraged the Texans. "We heard this morning that two
of our men were killed last night sometime, or this morning, by the citizens
... and a company was sent back to demolish the town," reported Alfred B.
Peticolas of the Fourth Texas Mounted Rifles. "Before they left the place,"
recounted another, "they [avenging soldiers] sent a few greasers to their father,
the devil, in payment for their treachery.'t"
By May, Sibley had fled the territory, leaving his tattered army to fend
for itself. For the next several months, the remainder of the volunteers
continued to battle with civilians as they made their way to Mesilla and then
across the scorching plains of West Texas toward San Antonio. "Instead of
fighting Yankees since Sibley left, we have to fight the Mexicans," declared a
volunteer. "They refused to let us have transportation, and we went to press
them into service, thereby creating a civil war with them." Near the village
of Isleta, Texas, a forage party rounded up what cattle they could find and,
having nothing to offer in exchange, simply seized them. When a village
official threatened to attack if they did not return the livestock promptly, the
Texans took cover and prepared for a fight. They shot and killed a civilian
rider, whom they surmised was running for help, and later made their escape
under the cover of darkness. In early July at Mesilla, a clash between New
Mexicans and another foraging party left one officer and six soldiers dead
and as many as forty civilians killed or wounded. The fighting had been close
and personal, and a Confederate lieutenant allegedly stabbed three civilians
with a bowie knife."
Perhaps the most violent confrontation between civilians and soldiers
occurred in Socorro, Texas. This tiny village in the far western part of the
state unfortunately sat directly in the path of the retreating Confederate
army. In mid-June, an officer of the Seventh Texas requisitioned a number
of beeves from the citizens and refused to pay when they were delivered. A
gunfight followed, leaving several Confederates wounded. The incensed
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Texans trained their artillery on the village. "We killed 20 and wounded a
great many," wrote one soldier, "besides destroying their church and otherwise
damaging the town." Several weeks later, another detachment of foragers
visited Socorro, but wise to the waysof the Texans, a mob of some fiftycitizens
quickly ran them OUt. 28

UnionDefense of New Mexico
Although New Mexicans suffered plundering, violence, and some deaths at
the hands of their Texan "liberators," they were treated little better by the
Union forces. Union officials were unclear about or doubted the loyalty of the
New Mexican citizens, particularly wealthy families. Union leaders enacted
harsh policies designed to police a suspect population as much as to counter
a Confederate invasion. Like General Sibley, Union colonel Canby, and
later Col. James H. Carleton, ordered New Mexicans to make draft animals,
forage, weapons, and other supplies available for purchase, or they might
be seized outright. Men were pressed into service a full year before military
conscription became national law.Territorial officials exhorted men to defend
their families from the Texans. Scattered evidence suggests the impressment
policy was sometimes brutally implemented by Union authorities and widely
resented by New Mexicans.
In early January 1862, Ickis noted the conspicuous absence of men from
a village in the northern part of the territory. "There are no men in the
town," he wrote. "They are skulking over the Mts to keep out of sight of
the Territorial pressman who are knabbing [sic] every man who.is able to
carry a musket and into the militia they go." Hispanic men of fighting age
were hesitant to leave their families unprotected and reluctant to join the
poorly equipped and scantily paid militia. They were commonly branded as
cowards, and unwilling recruits frequently clashed with the Union military.
One would-be Union recruit recounted his story to Peticolas, who recorded:
"They [federals] knocked him down, and he showed us a bayonet wound
where they stabbed him trying to force him along anyhow. He told us that
there was many a man sick that they had forced into the service, but that no
one was allowed to stop or rest on that account, but was forced along by the
federals.'??
These recruiting practices implied that Union officials looked upon New
Mexicans as less a people to defend than a resource to exploit. Nowhere
was this attitude more apparent than in the widespread foraging by Union
troops during the campaign. Suffering from the same subsistence problems
that plagued Confederates, Union volunteers gobbled up all the supplies
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they could locat~. The plundering committed by the Colorado volunteers
in particular rivaled the thoroughness of the Texans. When word of their
depredations reached Denver, one soldier explained to the RockyMountain
News: "Rumors have probably reached you, with a thousand tongues, of the
jay hawking propensities of the members of the Colorado First. ... Our duty
was onward, and onward we marched, seizing all that was necessary to assist
us in preventing the traitor's foot from impressing the soil of New Mexico,
and in doing it, though it might inflict individual losses, we believed we were
doing our duty." Ickis admitted frankly in his diary, "the Col ist are death on
chickens and sheep or beef. [T]hey steal all they see along the road. [T]hey
stole an entire store in Los Notres. [T]here was about

$1000

worth of goods

in it." Their racial conceptions of New Mexicans undoubtedly shaded the
reasoning of many Coloradoans. One volunteer stated, "[T]hey say if the
Mexicans will not fight for their country they must support those who will."
The notion that New Mexicans were cowards, traitors, cheats, and thieves
deserving such treatment was a common refrain among Colorado volunteers.
Ovando J. Hollister, who helped sack the Pueblo of Sandia, absolved his
conscience by declaring that he and his comrades were no worse than the
native population. "A man that won't steal," he quipped, "has no business in
New Mexico."30
The departure of Sibley's Texans and the arrival of Colonel Carleton
and his California column restored a modicum of order to New Mexico
Territory. Martial law, however, remained in effect until the end of the war.
Citizens forced by Sibley to swear an oath ofloyalty to the Confederacy were
now compelled to proclaim their allegiance to the Union. The army also
confiscated the property of suspected Confederate collaborators, forced men
to labor on fortifications without compensation, and ordered citizens to sell
their crops to the Union army at the ridiculously low price of three dollars per
fanega (about one and a half bushels) or risk their confiscation. The policy
to concentrate foodstuffs in the hands of the federal military met with much
civilian resistance. This backlash prompted one of Carleton's subordinates
to declare all residents found with more than a two-month supply of food
stores as enemies of the United States. Rather than comply with the directive,
many New Mexicans simply abandoned their lands and carried their surplus
crops into Mexico."
All these federal"policies were designed to thwart future armed incursions
from Texas. Carleton did not intend to tyrannize the population, but he made
perfectly clear his willingness to sacrifice native New Mexicans to prevent such
a recurrence. He ordered his lieutenants to counter the Texans with a scorchedearth campaign in the event of another invasion. As a last-ditch impediment
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to a future Confederate incursion, Carleton also urged New Mexicans to
wage a people's war against the Texans. "Remind the Mexicans of how they
were robbed before," he exhorted his subordinates, "and animate them ...
with a settled determination to attack the enemy from every cover.?"
Carleton's vision was an explosive proposition. An inherently bloodthirsty method, irregular warfare became all the more brutal when fanned
by racial animosity. The sporadic guerrilla actions at the end of Sibley's
New Mexico campaign indicated that a renewed conflict with the Texans
was likely to become an extraordinarily bloody affair. Indeed, the excessive
and indiscriminate violence engendered by guerrilla war had motivated
Northern and Southern leaders alike to condemn the practice, decry guerrillas
as "brigands" and "outlaws," and support their summary execution when
captured. That Carleton felt justified in calling for partisan action when
leaders in similar straits balked at such a drastic measure is not surprising
given his reputation for ruthlessness toward national enemies- be they Texans
or Indians. Carleton may also have assumed that he was merely sanctioning
the inevitable; New Mexicans had already demonstrated their readiness to
oppose Confederate depredations. Regardless, his willingness to exploit their
passions evidenced a startling disregard for the pyrrhic consequences. That
New Mexicans, rather than Anglos, would bear the brunt of Confederate
reprisals doubtless made his decision more palatable."
Fortunately for New Mexicans, the high tide of the Confederacy in
the Southwest had passed with Sibley's retreat, and the extreme measures
advocated by Carleton became unnecessary. New Mexico's strategic
importance and an ongoing Indian threat, however, ensured that a large
military presence and the problems attending it remained. In August 1862,
Maj. Arthur Morrison, an Anglo officer in a New Mexico volunteer regiment,
complained of a seemingly regular occurrence at Polvadera, a hamlet
situated between Socorro, New Mexico, and Albuquerque. "Government
trains passing up and down this route," Morrison complained, "commit
depredations on private citizens in turning cattle into their fields and
destroying their crops or only subsistence, maltreating animals, occasionally
killing one without necessity." Pillaging and foraging by individual soldiers
also continued, despite the best efforts of conscientious officers to stop the
practice. After 1 January 1863-the day U.S. president Abraham Lincoln's
Emancipation Proclamation took effect-soldiers began to "steal" people,
freeing peons from their Hispanic patrons and putting them to work in their
camps. The relationship between Union volunteers and Mexican Americans
remained uneasy throughout the occupied Southwest. American resentment
against "greasers," and Mexican wariness about the intention of soldados
(soldiers) always held the potential for and sometimes erupted in violence."
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Reprise of Manifest Destiny

The New Mexico Campaign of 1862 generated severalsignificantconsequences
for the Southwest. The defeat of Sibley's Texans effectively ended the
Confederate bid for a transcontinental empire. The influx of Anglo soldiers,
particularly Californians and Coloradoans, wrought important cultural
and demographic changes in the Southwest. Once considered a national
backwater, the territory of New Mexico and future territory ofArizona received
a good deal of publicity during the campaigns and battles from late 1861
through summer 1862. Many Union volunteers permanently settled there,
and their letters and descriptions of the territory (more generous than those
of the beaten Texans) attracted thousands of settlers and contributed to the
"Americanization" of Hispanic New Mexico. The most visible result of the
campaign was the widespread devastation between Mesilla and Santa Fe
and the famine that followed. Magdalen Hayden, mother superior of Loretto
Academy in Santa Fe, reported: "Our poor and distant territory has not been
spared. The Texans without provocation have sacked and almost ruined the
richest portions and have forced the most respectable families to flee from
their homes." The war hit Socorro County, south of Albuquerque, particularly
hard. In 1860 it boasted a population of 5,700 residents. Three years later,
that number had dropped to less than 3,700. Some villages, whose residents
were unable to sustain themselves, virtually disappeared. "The population of
this district, until last year, was much larger than at present," noted a Union
officer who conducted a census in 1863. "In every town there are houses
locked up and their owners having left in search of food.'?'
This devastation occurred rapidly and early in the Civil War. The morality
of widespread "foraging" was hotly disputed in early 1862 but by 1864 the zeal
with which Confederate and Union soldiers plundered the countryside was
legendary. The war escalated for three years before Union major general
William T. Sherman could justifyhis march of destruction through Georgia.
New Mexico experienced no comparable grace period; pillage, murder, and
destruction came immediately. Although starvation motivated Confederate
plundering and violence in the final stages of the campaign, it does not
explain their mob-like behavior during their first weeks in Mesilla. Similarly,
although hunger may account for why Coloradoans resorted to foraging and
looting, it explains neither why they did so with such apparent glee and selfrighteousness nor their continuing propensity to run roughshod over New
Mexican sensibilities even after the Confederate threat had been blunted.
The notoriously poor discipline among volunteers certainly explains some
of the unrestrained behavior, but this answer is unsatisfying.
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Soldiers' reactions to the depredations shed some light on the matter. This
author has not discovered a soldier- Texan, Coloradoan, or Californianwho expressed even a little regret over the hardships inflicted on New
Mexicans. This omission is especially striking when one considers how
Sherman's men or Confederate general Robert E. Lee's troops in Pennsylvania
often managed to sound sincerely remorseful, although they insisted on the
necessity and righteousness of their actions. For example a Confederate
officer who entered Pennsylvania determined to avenge the destruction of
his own home was incapable of acting on his anger after he came face to face
with terrified civilians. "Though I had such severe wrongs and grievances to
redress ... when I got among these people I could not find it in my heart to
molest them," he confided. "They looked so dreadfully scared and talked, so
humble, that I have invariably endeavored to protect their property."An officer
in an Ohio regiment, plainly aware of the devastation caused by the army as
it maneuvered toward Atlanta, Georgia, in the summer of 1864, expressed
similar sympathies. "I don't see what the people in this country are going to
do next winter," he pondered to his wife. "There will not be anything left
for them to live upon.... I sometimes feel sorry for the poorer class as they
were not to blame in bring[ ing] on this war. There is more of what is called
poor white trash than I had any idea of." The expression of pity assumed
that volunteers could empathize with their victims. Empathy required the
recognition of some commonality with their victims, a prerequisite that
volunteers campaigning in the alien culture of New Mexico were hard-pressed
to meet. Hence, while the plight of the Pennsylvania "Dutch" and Georgia's
"white trash" evoked genuine concern from the soldiers, starvation among
New Mexican "greasers" met only with their indifference."
Just as a common Anglo identity bound the belligerents, common
assumptions of New Mexican identity influenced their actions. To understand
the implications fully requires viewing the campaign in a wider ideological
context. Despite Sibley's reassurances to the people of New Mexico, the
invading Texans cared little about "liberating" them from a tyrannical
government. The Texans came, as numerous sources attested, to realize their
manifest destiny. Union forces, too, cared little about the New Mexicans. They
seemed more determined to protect the fruits of their own manifest destiny,
realized some thirteen years earlier when the United States first acquired
the territory after the war with Mexico. Economic exploitation and Anglo
hegemony informed the American philosophy of expansionism. Given these
assumptions, historians should not interpret pillaging and excesses carried
out by volunteers as acts of desperation or a failure of discipline but as the
military application of racial assumptions shared by Anglo Americans in the
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mid-nineteenth century. Simply put their sense of entitlement to the land
and contempt for its people drove their actions."
The echoes of manifest destiny motivated both Confederate and Union
soldiers in the southwestern theater, making it a unique location in the war.
That particular mandate for continental expansion had little bearing on
common troops elsewhere. Historians have long recognized manifest destiny's
racialist component, an unpalatable reality of Anglo culture prominently
displayed in New Mexico. This tradition of racialism creates space for more
general conclusions, especially in relation to the ongoing debate over the
"restraint" of the Civil War and the character of the soldiers who comprised
the bulk of its armies. The destructive tendencies of the volunteers, some
argue, were tempered by a keen sense of morality and justice. Union men
discriminated between the "guilty" (wealthy slaveholders) and the "innocent"
(yeoman farmers, women, and children), and favored the destruction of
public over private property. Such civilities, however, were extended only
to members of the same "American" (white) community. Where racial
differences came to the fore, restraint evaporated. A recent study by historian
Mark E. Neely [r., although agreeing with this premise, vigorously asserts that
race, not morality, was the determining factor in how soldiers treated civilians.
This work further suggests that compared to the abuse suffered by civilians
at the hands of Americans in other wars, such as the conflict with Mexico
or the Indian wars, much of the violence traditionally assigned to the Civil
War has been grossly exaggerated. In many ways, the actions of volunteers
in New Mexico support Neely's conclusions.f
Although enlightening, a similar comparative approach to the New Mexico
campaign also poses special problems. Such a comparison establishes a
false dichotomy that tends to obscure as much as it illuminates. To Anglo
volunteers, New Mexicans clearly served as the racial "other." Yet, according
to treaty laws and the territorial constitution, they were in fact legitimate
citizens who theoretically possessed all the rights and privileges of a Boston
Brahmin-unlike blacks and Indians. To separate the war in New Mexico
from the "greater" conflict in the East or to highlight the violence that soldiers
inflicted on Mexican Americans merely to reveal the restraint they exercised
toward white Americans is to propagate the same artificial division imposed
by the volunteers."
If historians are to address honestly the question of restraint, they must
include the New Mexico campaign in any overview of military-civilian
relations during the war, and it deserves to occupy a place next to
Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania and Sherman's march through Georgia.
Rehabilitated from its sideshow status, the campaign's integration into Civil
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War historiography makes readily apparent that any claim touting the war's
restraint must be seriously qualified. The lofty ideals ofliberty and freedom
and defense of home and hearth - ideals for which soldiers professed to
be fighting-were inextricably bound to oppression, intolerance, and the
maintenance of white privilege. The idea that volunteers by and large directed
their wrath only toward the "guilty,"limited their destruction of private property,
and respected civilians in general and women in particular would surely have
come as a revelation to the "liberated" residents of the Mesilla valley.
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Journey to the "Outside"
THE

u.s. ARMY ON THE ROAD TO THE

SOUTHWEST

Janne Lahti

I

n summer 1869, Julia Davis had just returned from a year-long honeymoon
in Europe. She hoped that the U.S. Army would assign her husband,
Capt. Murray Davis, to a pleasant station somewhere near their Oakland,
California, home where they could raise their infant son insafety and comfort.
When the orders arrived, however, they brought unwelcome news. Captain
Davis was instructed to take charge of a body of troops and lead it across the
desert to Arizona Territory. Julia wrote, "I thought of my husband going down
and the dangers ofIndian warfare, and being perhaps killed by savages, whilst
1 was far away, and 1 could not bear it." Worried that the journey and life in
Arizona would be too demanding on his wife and child, Captain Davis insisted
that they stay in California and left for his new post. Deciding otherwise Julia
packed hastily, gathered their son and a nurse, and caught up to her husband
in San Diego, California. She recalled: "All my friends of course cried out 1
was mad. 1should die of hardship and fatigue, and my husband would have to
bury me in the desert." After some heated arguments with her husband, Julia
joined a detachment of the Eighth Cavalry, numbering twenty-four enlisted
men and two officers, for the journey of forty-one days and approximately
six hundred miles to Camp McDowell, Arizona.'
[anne Lahti earned his PhD in general history from the University of Helsinki, Finland. He
specializes in the history of the American West, indigenous peoples, and colonialism. He is
currently revising his dissertation, which offers a sociocultural history of the U.S. Army in the
post-Civil War Southwest and is under contract with the University of Nebraska Press. He would
like to thank John Wunder, Markku Henriksson, Margaret Jacobs, Kevin Adams, Bruce Dinges,
Robert Wooster, and Durwood Ball for their valuable help in bringing this article to fruition.
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This essay describes U.S. Army journeys to Arizona and New Mexico
territories from the end of the Civil War in 1865, when the regular army
returned to the Southwest, to the time when the transcontinental railroads
crossed the region in the early 1880s. Balancing representations (army
stories) and social experience (army actions), this narrative describes how
travel methods, social class, and the search for colonial power structured
responses to the travel experience. Uncertain expectations, plain ignorance,
and the failure of travel comforts plagued the army's pre-railroad era journeys
in the Southwest. These factors negatively impacted the representations
penned by officers, wives, and enlisted men. Their portrayals express
genuine disappointment and shock at both the natural environment and
the indigenous, Hispanic, and Anglo societies of the region. These written
accounts show how the authors differentiated themselves from the peoples
and landscapes that failed to meet their standard of civilization. Travelers
supposed they were producing the "truth" in their writings, but in reality they
constructed subjective knowledge designed to secure colonial authority and
power for the new rule and rulers,"
In the colonial context, travel was much more than simple movement
across space. It was, in fact, a crucial site in the production of colonizer identity
and power. Literary scholar Sara Mills argues, "Travel writing is essentially an
instrument within colonial expansion and served to reinforce colonial rule
once in place." Similarly, anthropologist Mary Louise Pratt concludes that
travel writing helped produce "Europe's differentiated conceptions of itself
in relation to something it became possible to call 'the rest of the world.?"
Travelers assigned specific meanings to themselves, the journeying process,
andthe landscapes, peoples, and settlements they encountered. They judged
the suitability of the travel region for the purposes of the colonial regime and
evaluated it against their norms, while simultaneously constructing specific
identities for themselves.
Historians of the U.S. West have long been fascinated with a specific
form of travel: overland migration. Some scholars have also discussed the
experiences of European visitors in the West, such as the famous British
explorer Sir Richard Burton. Despite interest in the literary genre, the army
remains largely absent in most descriptions of travel in the West.' Within
the context of travel, historians have typically focused on army explorers.'
Arguably, some have also given attention to "travel" experiences in the field
during military campaigns and some have examined the travels of army
wives. Nevertheless, scholars have failed to adequately assess the journeys
that officers, their wives, and enlisted men regularly embarked on to reach
their western stations. White army men and women often traveled from
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one region to the next and wrote voluminously of their journeys. While the
historical literature certainly addresses the army's presence in the West, it
rarely includes what army personnel had to say about how they got to different
locations in the region, and has no journey or subsequent travel writing." By
discussing army journeys and investigating army narratives, historians can
scrutinize a little-known side of U.S. military history.
Most scholarship neither connects western journeys to colonialism nor
critically analyses travel as a domain where the travelers produced their identity
and constructed their power. This study links writings generated by officers,
wives, and soldiers to the establishment of colonial power and identity. This
work also connects U.S. Army history to the worldwide process of European
colonialism, which brought much of the globe under the control of western
powers during the second half.of the nineteenth century. Because of its
intended mission of conquest, the army is an especially valuable subject in
understanding the relationship between travel narratives and colonial power.
Issues concerning gender and class can also be teased from travel literature.
Although some historians have examined the travels of army wives, they have
often failed to subject the wives' writings to critical interrogation. Instead of
treating the writings produced by army wivesas subjective colonial discourses,
scholars have uncritically described the wives "bravery" or "resilience" in
the face of "primitive conditions" and "terrible hardships.'? This approach
is common among histories of travel in the West and deserves correction.
By analyzing class within army journeys, historians can gain a fuller
understanding of the main social division separating officers and their wives
from white enlisted men. Although military historians have recognized the
army's class divide for quite some time, their focus has not been on army
joumevs.f Certainly, class defined life inside army posts and in the field
during military campaigns. The journey to colonial stations also produced
class identity and imparted a sense of social standing to the travelers.
In the Southwest, annexed from Mexico in 1848 and 1854, the army
represented a congregation of foreigners. Apart from the Native American
soldiers hired by the army, all officers, enlisted men, and their dependents in
the West originated from other regions in the United States, other countries,
and even other continents. White enlisted men generally came from two
sources: the urban working class in the East and groups of immigrants from
Europe, especially Germans and Irishmen. Officers and their wives were
American-born middle-class whites who came mostly from the eastern United
States and had largely rural or small-town backgrounds." In the East, the
prospects for an average army officer were rather dismal after the Civil War.
The American people were traditionally suspicious of large standing armies
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and were tired of the bloody fighting. They wanted to forget war's horrors and
pursue peaceful endeavors. Reflecting this consensus, Congress drastically
reduced troop numbers from one million to twenty-seven thousand men
between 1866 and 1874.10 The remaining enlisted men and officers were sent
either to control the Trans-Mississippi West or to supervise Reconstruction.
Consequently, people in the East no longer felt the presence and influence
of the army in their everyday lives, and the American public soon forgot that
the nation even had a regular army. When an eastern woman was introduced
to a colonel of the army in 1885 she remarked, "I supposed the Army was all
disbanded at the close of the warl'"
Unnecessary and unwanted in the East, army officers and their wives
identified with other middle-class Americans after the Civil War. Historian
Brenda K. Jackson states that middle-class Americans sawtheir social position
decline and economic opportunities disappear in the increasingly industrial
postwar United States." Consequently, these families moved west in search
of not only wealth but also social prominence. While declining economic
opportunities forced members of established merchant and farming families
to relocate, army officers moved because U.S. conquest called them west.
Although some officers constructed their identities in the West by
obsessively recalling the glory of their Civil War service, most, especially of
the younger generation, built their identity in the framework of continental
conquest." Officers and their wives sought to establish themselves as
an acknowledged class of refined and honorable people: a select group
of intelligent gentlemen and cultured women who embodied power,
respectability, progress, and civilization. They saw themselves as liberators
and nation-makers and as the cream of the white middle class. They wanted
to lead the civilizing mission by personal example as they transplanted eastern
middle-class values, standards, and lifestylesto the West. Officers were among
the first white Americans with college-level training to enter the Southwest
after the U.S.-Mexico War. When the regulars returned to the Southwest
after the Civil War, many officers brought with them personal or family ties
to politicians, businessmen, and newspaper journalists in the East. Many
officers published memoirs, engaged in extensive personal correspondence,
or contributed to professional journals and various local and national papers,
thus actively circulating their colonial views and "truths."
Officers and soldiers never permanently settled at one army post or in a
single territory or state. Instead, they constituted a community of transient
conquerors, moving from one station to another, crisscrossing the West,
and sometimes the continent, in irregular intervals. The army believed that
the term of a unit's service in regions consid~red remote and unhealthy
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MAP 1. BORDER CONFLICT, 1870-86
Map detail from Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indians,
1866-1891 by Robert M. Utley (University of Nebraska Press, 1973)'
(Courtesy Robert M. Utley)

should be between two and four years. Due to this policy, nine out of the
ten total army cavalry regiments were represented at one time or another in
New Mexico or Arizona between 1868 and 1886. During this same period,
contingents from eight infantry regiments served in Arizona and units from
six infantry regiments served in New Mexico." In addition to the exchange
of army units, officers on leave or on detached service, discharged enlisted
men, deserters, and new recruits created considerable army traffic to and
from the Southwest. The turnover among enlisted men was high. The army
replaced an estimated 25 to 40 percent of the approximately three thousand
men stationed in Arizona and New Mexico each year."
The army units assigned to stations in the Southwest approached their
journey and the alien region that would be their home with preconceptions
based on ignorance or fear. In 1866 the Southwest was not entirely unknown
to the American people. Anglo merchants, trappers, and explorers, as well as
prospectors on their way to California gold fields, traversed the area prior to
the Civil War. Since the 1820S, the Santa Fe Trail had lured Anglo merchants
and American goods into the Southwest, making Santa Fe a well-established
American outpost. Yet, neither ranching nor mining had yet boomed in the
Southwest, and the region still lacked an industrial foundation. Consequently,
few white Americans or European immigrants lived in the Southwest, had
visited the region, or knew much about it in 1866.
Before departing for Civil War theaters of war in the East, the army had
established a presence in the Southwest and made conclusions about the
region. Several officers considered the region unsuitable for Anglo futures.
In 1852 New Mexico department commander Lt. Col. Edwin V. Sumner
suggested that the United States should abandon the Southwest." It is
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unclear how much the post-Civil War generation of officers, soldiers, and
dependents who had not served in the prewar Southwest knew about these
earlier experiences in the region. According to Martha Summerhayes, an
officer's wife who first entered Arizona in 1874,"old campaigners" in the army
"knew a thing or two about Arizona," whereas her younger cohort "did not
know." "We had never heard much about this part of our country," she wrote.
Another army wife, Frances Boyd, remembered that she and her husband
started their "pilgrimage" toward the Southwest in 1869 with "childlike
simplicity," completely ignorant of what awaited them. And Lt. Frederick E.
Phelps relied on reading a book about New Mexico at West Point Military
Academy for information on his assignment."
As late as the 1880s, army personnel assigned to the Southwest claimed
that they knew little about Arizona or New Mexico before traveling to the
area. When Lt. Thomas Cruse received his assignment to Fort Apache,
Arizona, he was unable to locate his destination on the maps available to
him in the East. Will C. Barnes, a soldier ordered to Arizona, noted in his
diary that in his mind Arizona "seemed like a fairyland so far away.?" Many
were frightened by rumors and tales of the journey ahead. According to Lt.
Col. George Crook, "the climate of Arizona had such a bad reputation that
I feared for my health," while army surgeon Henry R. Porter was told that
it was "hot as hell." Porter also expressed concern over the "troublesome
Indians" and Mexicans who "delight in robbing mails and passengers." He
was convinced that because of this danger, "no one thinks of going to Arizona
without being well armed." For Summerhayes, Arizona was a "dreaded" and
"unknown land," and she worried that an "uncertain future was before me."?
In the 1880s, Alice Applegate Sargent, an officer's wife, wrote, "We did not
much relish the prospect of going to Arizona, for many and lurid were the
tales that were told of the dreadful heat, the sand storms, the Gila monsters,
centipedes, tarantulas etc., but when Uncle Sam said 'March,' we marched."20
In 1866, when the regular army began returning to the Southwest from the
Civil War, the region was not easily accessible. No transcontinental railroad
traversed across the Southwest and no water routes, except on the lower
Colorado River, penetrated it. Capt. John G. Bourke wrote, "Arizona was in
those days separated from 'God's Country' by a space of more than fifteen
hundred miles.'?' Incoming and outgoing troops resorted to a combination of
boats, wagons, stage coaches, mules, and horses to reach their destinations.
Many enlisted men simply walked. After the nation's first transcontinental
railroad was completed in 1869, connecting California to the East via a central
route, train travel became an option.
When Will Barnes, a private in the Signal Corps, was ordered to Arizona in
late 1879, he first used the transcontinental railroad to reach San Francisco,
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California, and then, after a week's leave, sailed on a steamer to San Diego,
changing boats in Los Angeles. From San Diego he took the stage to Yuma,
Arizona, on the Colorado River and then continued by rail to its terminus,
which at this time was near Casa Grande, Arizona, some 135 miles distant.
After waiting two days for a vacant seat on a stage coach, he journeyed
onward to Tucson, Arizona. There, after receiving orders to report to Fort
Apache, Arizona, "that far-away, out-of-the-world frontier military post,"
Barnes took the eastbound stage coach and after a ride of 125 miles changed
to a two-seated open buckboard. He reached Fort Grant, Arizona, via roads
that were "just as nature made them; a foot deep in dust in dry weather,
and often bottomless mud in wet weather." Again waiting a few days, he
then journeyed by buckboard to Fort Thomas, Arizona, where, following
another delay of four days, Barnes faced a "solemn-faced old government
mule," which would carry him the rest of the way to Fort Apache over a
rough, steep, and "perfectly awful" trail. After weeks of travel by ocean
steamer, train, stage coach, buckboard, and mule, Barnes finally arrived
at his new military horne.f
Barnes's journey was rather typical in the sense that officers and soldiers,
with families, routinely made these arduous journeys across the terrain of the
Southwest. While Barnes traveled alone, the majority of soldiers and many of
the officers and their wives, like Julia Davis, arrived in sizable army columns.
The army penetrated southern Arizona and New Mexico both from the east
and the west. Soldiers assigned to New Mexico usually moved overland either
via Fort Union and Santa Fe in the northeastern part of the territory or, less
frequently, from the south, through El Paso, Texas." To reach Arizona, army
personnel and dependents often ventured by way of the Pacific Ocean and
California. When departing from the eastern United States for Arizona, the
first step was a sea voyage to the Panama Isthmus, followed by further oceanic
travel to Pacific seaports such as San Diego and San Francisco.
After the advent of the transcontinental railroad in 1869, a trip to San
Francisco took approximately nine days by rail when departing from New York
City." Army travelers continued from San Francisco, often by boat, southward
either to Drum Barracks outside Los Angeles or to San Diego. In the 187os,
both supplies and troops were increasingly transported by steamboat from
southern California around Cape San Lucas, the southern tip of the Mexican
Baja California peninsula, to the mouth of the Colorado River and then up the
river by small steamers to forts Yuma and Mojave, Arizona. The army had first
explored and established steamboat traffic on the Colorado River in the 185os,
and this water route played a significant transportation role until the Southern
Pacific Railroad reached the river at Yuma in 1877. The army also moved
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troops and supplies over land through the Sierra Nevada and the Mojave and
Colorado deserts. Army personnel went from Drum Barracks to Fort Mojave
(approximately 285 miles) or alternatively to Ehrenberg, Arizona (293 miles)
and from San Diego to Fort Yuma (200 miles). Forts Yuma and Mojave acted
as gateways to points farther east in Arizona. From Mojave the main routes led
toward Prescott, Arizona, while Yuma roads went in the direction of'Tucson.f
Whether the troops started their journey toward the Southwest from
the Great Plains, the Pacific Northwest, or east of the Mississippi River,
the distances proved enormous. The companies of the Third Cavalry from
Wyoming Territory marched 1,190 miles on average when assigned to the
Southwest. Even longer journeys awaited the Twelfth Infantry when sent
from Arizona to the East, with trips averaging 2,602 miles.i"
Distance was not the only challenge posed by army travel. Overland
travel was often conducted in massive columns, making the journeys timeconsuming, slow, and cumbersome. Boyd wrote, "Nothing in my whole army
experience wearied me so much as those endless days of slow, monotonous
travel." Bourke felt much the same: "Our battalion slowly crawled from
camp to camp with no incident to break the dull monotony."27 When the
Fifth Cavalry left the Southwest in 1875 and was replaced by the Sixth from
Colorado, Indian Territory, and Kansas, approximately 400 to 450 men moved
at a time. Slow moving army columns, which consumed vast amounts of
water, food, and forage, appeared like moving clouds of dust when seen from
a distance. Because of the slow pace of travel, these unit transfers often took
several months to complete. When the men and women of the Eighth Cavalry
from New Mexico exchanged places with the Ninth from Texas, they spent
anywhere from eight weeks to four months on the road." Even the relatively
"short" trip between San Diego and Fort Apache took six weeks, and in 1866
troops from the Third Cavalry marched for nearly ten weeks from Fort Smith,
Arkansas, to Fort Union, New Mexico."
Despite the long and. cumbersome nature of army journeys, officers and
their wives considered themselves paragons of Victorian civilization in the
West. This image demanded that they maintain a high standard ofliving and
sense of refinement during their travels. Ideally, officers and their wives hoped
to arrange leisurely journeys. In 1871 "Nannie" Mills, an officer's wife, wrote,
"We expect to have a very nice time" en route." In reality, during the prerailroad era, trips proved long and arduous, and exposure to the elements was
painful and taxing for many unprepared, overconfident, and inexperienced
army travelers. As their journeys progressed, officers and their wives became
increasingly disappointed with what they experienced, which in turn shaped
their representations of the region.
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For most officers and their wives, a successful joumey required the help
of servants, either civilians or soldiers. Officers strove to employ maids,
body servants, nurses, and other laborers to do much of their physical work
and provide for their comfort." No less important to officers and wives was
arranging accommodation on boats and wagons that reflected the travelers'
class, sense of style and taste, and level of sophistication. In boats they
preferred to reside in what Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, an army surgeon's
wife, referred to as "very comfortable" staterooms. Books, music, singing,
conversations, and games made the days pass quickly. While officers and their
families sought to enjoy cheerful leisure in the company of "respectable"
people, servants made their beds, hauled travel trunks between the vessel's
hold and quarters, and served drinks and meals.F
During overland journeys, many officers' families sought to make their
wagons comfortable and refined. Capt. Anson Mills and his wife had their
wagon covered with white canvas, added an "elegant green blanket to line the
top to keep off the heat and protect the eyes," put up curtains for ventilation
and privacy, installed removable seats that made room for the bed, and
built in little pockets for small articles inside the wagon. The wagon was as
"convenient and elegant a thing as one could imagine," and even "a queen
might be proud to ride in it." Wagons, then, served as a symbol of class status,
especially when officers and wives did not have to drive but instead hired
teamsters or assigned drivers from the enlisted ranks."
A successful travel experience also entailed a plethora of material comforts.
Officers and dependents carried a large supply of different goods including
bags, books, cases, baskets, linen, sewing materials, clothes, shawls, china,
silver, guns, sabers, fresh and canned fruits, candles, chairs, rocking chairs,
mattresses, and matting for the Hoors. Describing the inside of her wagon
during the first day of travel, Eveline Alexander, an officer's wife, wrote, "I
cannot begin to enumerate the various articles with which I was surrounded."
Officers and wives categorized most of the items as necessary for "survival"
en route, while the remaining articles were considered critical for homemaking in their new posts.34 Operating under the assumption that her family
could obtain nothing along the way, Julia Davis stuffed her baggage wagon
with "linen, books, a bed, pictures, curtains - everything I could think of for
house-keeping."35 Generally, the limit of baggage the army allowed one officer
was three large army chests, or approximately one thousand pounds. Officers
had to pay for any excess weight. Many army families regarded these limits as
ridiculously low. They insisted on taking all their belongings and complained
that they"could not exist" without them. When told to pack, some army wives,
staggered by the weight restrictions, were unable to decide what to take and
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what to leave and simply stared paralyzed at their belongings. Officers and
their wives often left the actual packing to their servants. Summerhayes, for
example, confessed that she was utterly helpless in packing and simply did
not know how to do it."
When camping on the road, officers and their wives aimed to consolidate
their class status by displaying style and sophistication. Wives wrote that they
took "a passive position" or sought "a comfortable place to rest" by sitting
on, for example, "a fine willow rocker" while the enlisted men unpacked
and packed the wagons, put up tents, and prepared meals." On one wagon
journey, officers and their wives enjoyed a breakfast of coffee, eggs, bacon,
bread and butter, condensed milk, and hard bread, while dinner consisted
of canned meat, vegetables, bread and butter, coffee, and canned fruits. The
presentation of the meals was no less important than the menu. Corbusier
remembered that on the road, meals were served on a red and white tablecloth
spread on the ground. Officers and their dependents gathered together and
sat on boxes with their plates, cups, knives, forks, spoons, and napkins."
Boyd described another traveling party which, for its dining pleasure,
hauled a special tent furnished with a board floor to offer more comfortable
surroundings and to shelter against the wind, dust, and heat." Camp life,
the menu, utensils, and the setting demonstrate how officers and their wives
cherished specific conventions and tried to observe or apply them even when
on the road in the Southwest.
Dress was another potent symbol of class status. Julia Davis, adjusting her
appearance to the demands of the overland journey, wore a blue serge dress
with no hoops or extra skirts, braided her hair in one long tail, and sported
a hat large enough to' hide her almost entirely." It seems that Julia was well
prepared, wearing what Helen Fuller Davis, another officer's wife, called
"sensible clothes for traveling." Other wives prioritized appearing genteel
over practical utility. Lydia Spencer Lane, for instance, noted that the dress of
many wives was more suited to Fifth Avenue in New Yorkthan a six-hundredmile ride in an army ambulance." Some unprepared army families took to the
road without any bedding or tents, anticipating wrongly that they would sleep
at ranches. They actually spent their nights in the wagons or relied on the
kindness of those fellow travelers who offered to share space in their tents."
Disappointment permeated many army journeys. For one thing,
some officers and wives complained about their travel accommodations,
grumbling that their tents and wagons were like ovens. Not everyone
could secure, or afford, the kind of transportation that they would have
preferred. During her trip, Boyd was irritated when she was "refused proper
transportation-an ambulance and four mules with driver" and had to
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settle for "a small, two-seated vehicle and span of horses." Julia Davis was
unhappy that her white topped wagon pulled by four horses had nothing
but a simple mattress laid in it: "In this we were to live, sleep, and travel.??
Many army wives quickly found that their material comforts did not provide
immunity from the heat, sand, and dust of the southwestern roads. Their
fine appearance crumbled and their entertainments failed. Heavy clothing
suffocated them, and their elegant hats did not shade their heads and faces,
which burned and blistered. Summerhayes was disgusted with her "rather
fagged and seedy" appearance and regretted not bringing along enough "thin
wash-bodices" to battle the dust that covered her from head to toe. Helen
Davis was disappointed that, after a day of traveling in the intense heat, her
companions were too exhausted to play cards in the evening." In addition,
fires, wagon roll overs, and other accidents caused material losses and mental
stress.Any goods or items destroyed could be replaced only through borrowing
from others or ordering from the eastern United States."
Travel on boats was often equally miserable. Intense heat in the quarters
and rooms could sap the energy of army people to the point that no one could
maintain conversations or entertainments. High temperatures in the Gulf of
California and on the Colorado River made the staterooms so unbearable that
officers and families escaped to the deck to sleep during the night. According
to Summerhayes, the days were "interminable" and the heat "destroyed both
our good looks and our tempers." She had "never felt such heat, and no one
else ever had or has since."46 Army travelers wandered around the boat in
search of cool spots. Heat was not the only inconvenience for officers and
their wives traveling by boat. They also had to contend with seasickness,
and a lack of services, amenities, and companionship. Other army people
were troubled by the river steamer crews on the Colorado River that were
composed mostly of "savage" Indians."
The availability and quality of food and drink was also an issue for
many officers and their wives traveling by boat. Gen. Oliver O. Howard
grumbled that the "cooking was about as bad as it could be." Summerhayes
remembered, "The ice supply decreased alarmingly, the meats turned green
... and the odor which ascended from ... [the] refrigerator was indescribable."
After drinking black coffee and "bad warm water" for nine days, she was
"longing for a cup of good tea or a glass of fresh, sweet milk." The twelve
coconuts she had bought from a group of Mexicans who boarded the vessel
to sell fruits and vegetables did not help for long. In Guaymas, Sonora,
Summerhayes, by now "desperately hungry and thirsty," went ashore in search
of better food and refreshments. She stated, "I mustered what Spanish I knew,
and told ... I would pay ... any price for a cup of coffee with fresh milk."
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Luckily, she had an ample supply of dollars, and she bought not only coffee
with milk, but fresh butter, chicken, creamy biscuits, and more coconuts."
Officers, especially those with higher rank and better salary, could oftentimes
afford to improve their travel diet by purchasing food at high cost wherever
it was available. For example Anson Mills and his wife invested eighteen
dollars-more than a month's salary for an enlisted soldier-on apples,
lemons, and oranges to refresh their food stocks on their journey."
Enlisted men experienced even more arduous journeys than those
described by officers and wives. The common soldier sailed on flatboats
towed by the steamers on rivers and rode in boxcars or in day coaches aboard
trains." Or on overland journeys, when the officers rode in their wagons,
the enlisted men, not belonging to the "happy favored" class as one of them
sarcastically commented, simply marched. Whatever the mode of travel, the
class division between enlisted men and the officers persisted. "Cashuntz," an
enlisted soldier, wrote that "after a march of 268 miles we reached this corner
of the human garden, Fort Yuma.... Yes, here we are, shirtless, shoeless,
and I might with propriety add brainless." His unit's marching had been an
exhausting ordeal that tore the men to pieces both physically and mentally.
The rest periods usually proved too short for the exhausted soldiers, and they
had to get up so "barely" past "twelve 0' clock midnight" that the enlisted men
dubbed their early breakfast "supper/'" Barnes wrote, "Traveling in the desert
those days was a very primitive matter." To the amazement and outrage of
the enlisted men, officers sometimes left the men to struggle by themselves.
For example John Spring recollected that when his unit marched from
Drum Barracks to Yuma officers found the trip "somewhat tedious" in their
ambulances and therefore left the columns in charge of noncommissioned
officers and rode ahead as quickly as possible to the next resting place?
Unlike officers and wives, enlisted men had very few material goods to
transport. Enlisted men also lacked the economic means to ease their travel
burdens. They had no servants, few personal luxury items, and little money
with which to purchase fruits and vegetables to supplement their poor rations.
Fresh meat wasa rarity and fresh vegetables were almost never seen. Hardtack,
beans, and coffee- standard army fare- kept the enlisted men going. During
the journey, some sold or exchanged their clothes for whiskey from locals."
Although some officers and wives realized that common soldiers suffered
more than they did, they still usually expected enlisted men to serve them,
cook their food, make their beds, and erect their tents. Soldiers quickly learned
to know their place. One veteran army wife gave the following advice to
Summerhayes: ''You must never try to do any cooking at the camp-fire. The
soldiers are there for that work.T"

FALL2010

During the pre-railroad era, the western route to Arizona inspired army
men and women to write more about their journey into the Southwest than
any other arrny path into the region. These travelers used descriptions of
the passage from California to Arizona to construct their own identity and
power, to differentiate the colonial region from the eastern United States,
and to symbolize what entering the Southwest meant for the army. These
accounts described a journey to the "outside": a perilous descent from the
civilized world into a foreign and remote wilderness. 55 Army discourses never
characterized army actions as part of an unjust conquest of other peoples'
land. Instead, journeys were portrayed as sites that tested the army traveler's
resilience and character and established their superiority in relation to the
colonial terrain and peoples.
Army travelers often presented the beginning of their journeys as "normal"
civilized travel, a quiet prelude that stood in stark contrast to upcoming
challenges. Traveling overland, Boyd wrote that she enjoyed civilized San
Francisco and charming Los Angeles. During the first days of travel inland
from Los Angeles she experienced the most beautiful country imaginable.
Roads were good and nights were enjoyed in people's homes with good
food and comfortable beds. She felt happy and confident. On the fifth day,
however, conditions changed. The column left "civilization" behind and
entered the endless track of sand and the terrifying heat of the Mojave Desert.
Starting inland from San Diego, Crook traveled the first days over a hilly,
mountainous country, before dropping "down into the Colorado Desert."
From "there to Yuma it was like being in an oven," Crook wrote."
The "uninteresting and monotonous country" of the California deserts
appeared to weary army eyes as forlorn peripheries plagued with crushing
heat, furnace-like winds that raised dreadful sand storms, and aridity. The
desert was generally portrayed as "one vast expanse of sifting sand." Boyd
described the Mojave Desert: "In all my frontier life and travel I never saw
anything so utterly desolate as was that desert." Nannie Mills confessed that
she "had no idea that such a forlorn district was comprised within the limits
of the United States." Army travelers saw no lush forests, fertile fields, or even
grass. "We never saw anything which, by a vigorous effort of our imagination,
could be called a patch of grass," recalled Lt. Camillo C. C. Carr.? Some
travelers were further disappointed when they reached the Colorado River.
Ellen McGowan Biddle, an officer's wife, described the Colorado as "broad,
shallow, and full of quicksands that are constantly changing." Joseph Corson,
an army surgeon, called it the "most turbulent" river with a "furious current."
For Summerhayes it was an unknown, mighty, and untamed river with a
"swift-flowing current" that "sweepjs] by like a mass of seething red liquid,
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turbulent and thick and treacherous." George H. Cranston, an enlisted soldier,
was shocked that the river seemed "nearly half sand."58
The army labeled Fort Yuma, the military post on the Colorado River,
"the hottest place that ever existed." Almost all travelers tellingly repeated
a well-circulated army legend: a soldier who had died at Yuma returned to
beg for his blankets, for he found hell too cold a place for his taste." Adding
to the distress of new arrivals were the troops whom they saw going the other
direction or leaving Arizona. Summerhayes recollected, "From the great joy
manifested by them all, I drew my conclusions as to what lay before us, in
the dry and desolate country we were about to enter."60

As her husband's column marched inland, Julia Davis became utterly
disappointed with the conditions. After leaving San Diego, she sensed that
the officers, troops, and dependents "were going farther and farther from
civilization." On their route, they encountered only "glaring sand, and alkali
dust." There was "not a tree, not a shrub, not a green thing of any kind,"
and the "monotony" of the landscape was "only broken by rocks, frightful
hideous rocks ... You cannot fancy such a country!" Genuinely disquieted
she wrote, "Every day the sun came up fierce, unclouded, into the dazzling
sky, and burned over our heads, and grew hotter and hotter, and the alkali
sands scorched our eyes, and choked us until we gasped for breath, and the
heat from the ground seemed greater even than the heat from the sun."
Revealing her ignorance of the region, Davis confessed that before the journey
started she "had dreamt of a tropical vegetation, and forests and prairies"
but now found "a desert-great bare purple rocks, and still more bare tracks
of sand."?' Officers and their wives were disturbed by and disgusted with the
desert environment. Compared to the farmlands and forests in the East,
the southwestern landscapes they encountered seemed like unproductive
wastelands.
Officers and their wives liked the desert's people no better. According to
many travelers the Colorado River area was settled primarily by a "poor class"
of Mexicans, "lazy, more than half-naked Indians," or half-breeds. Officers and
their families contrasted local Indian and Hispanic people with Anglo society
and deemed the region's inhabitants unintelligent and unproductive. Army
personnel felt the locals were unable to tame nature for the sake of industry
or build a prosperous and moral society anywhere, let alone in a demanding
desert environment. The writings of officers and their wives implied that to
develop the Southwest, a better class of white men and women needed to
settle the region. With only a handful of white people and few or no middleclass whites, the area lacked "proper" society and was "foreign" and "inferior."
Army men and women saw no prosperous family farms, thriving industrial
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centers, or small orderly towns built of brick and wood. Similarly they saw
no "hard-working" and "moral" middle-class whites dominating the region.
Instead, army perceptions of the Southwest were based on places like Gila
City, Arizona, once a boom town for silver. Summerhayes commented that
the town was "not exactly a city, to be sure" but "a few old adobe houses and
the usual saloon." Biddle categorized another Arizona town, Ehrenberg, as
"entirely isolated from the world," while Summerhayes wrote that "of all
dreary, miserable-looking settlements· that one could possibly imagine, that
[Ehrenberg] was the worst. An unfriendly, dirty, and Heaven-forsaken place."
For Capt. Guy Henry, Arizona City was "quite a town, balls and shootings
being the order of the day." Others painted it as "the home of the bad man"
or as "a distinguished village" consisting of two rows of adobe huts along a
wide street with no walk, but plenty of villainous dens, and "indeed little
else." "Sabre," an army paymaster, observed of Arizona City, "One might
travel a long way before seeing a more God-forsaken looking city."62
Army people usually labeled the Indians living near the Colorado River
as harmless naked savages and ignorant wretches who lived a stone-age
existence.f As the travelers left the Colorado River, their perception of
indigenous peoples changed dramatically, and their fear of Indian attacks,
especially from Apaches, increased. East of Yuma, army people crossed areas
occupied by Maricopas or Tohono O'odharns, and farther to the north they
entered Yavapai or Pai territory. As they neared the heartland of Apacheria,
some army personnel and families, having heard stories of travelers killed and
mutilated by Indians and witnessed sites of previous attacks along the route,
grew increasingly worried. They imagined that there were Apaches behind
every rock ready to attack at any moment. According to Julia Davis, units
stuck close together and allowed no stragglers, because "we knew the Indians
were watching us, and we never knew when they might attack." Army people
reasoned that the Indians did not usually attack because the troops moved in
large numbers and the Apaches dared not to confront them.r' Surviving to
tell the tales of the "Apache threat" was part of constructing army journeys
as struggles that tested officers, enlisted men, and dependents. By casting
the local Indians as murderous savages swarming the desert, army personnel
validated the army's mission of conquest, established the Apaches' inferiority
to the army, and made the army appear heroic and brave.
Particularly between the Colorado River and Tucson, Prescott, and other
army outposts, army travelers constructed the Southwest as an "empty" region
with few inhabitants except those dangerous Indians. "After passing Fort
Yuma," Julia Davis wrote, "we were in the Indian country and had quite left
all civilization behind." Writing on the same region, Summerhayes felt "as
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though we were saying good-bye to the world and civilization." Still others
remarked that they had entered total emptiness. Biddle declared, "As far as
the eye could reach not a sign oflife could be seen; we seemed to be the only
living people on the planet."65 Only a few isolated ranches, many of which
functioned as rest stops for the army travelers, dotted this "Indian country,"
and these were "only low adobe dwellings," not proper civilized homes.
Some of the rest stops proved "primitive to the extreme," with apparently
unsanitary washing conditions and inadequate eating facilities. Summerhayes
exclaimed, "Wretched, forbidding-looking places they were! Never a tree or a
bush to give shade, never any sign of comfort or home." Barnes was stunned
and appalled when, in the
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degree heat, he dined under a brush shelter

harassed by swarms of hungry flies while waited on by a Yuma Indian woman
naked from the waist Up.66
According to army texts, travel conditions for those journeying east were
generally at least as bad after the Colorado River as before it. Carr described
the principal road from Yuma toward New Mexico as "a dreary, sandy waste
of quite four hundred miles." Crook complained that "the heat of the trip up
the Gila River was quite as bad as it had been over the desert, and the dust
and flies added made it almost unbearable ... the worst feature was that the
nights were so hot that it was impossible to sleep, and we would get up in the
morning almost as tired as when we went to bed." The continuing uncertainty
about water sources added to the suffering. Many travelers also had to pay for
water hauled up from deep wells. Yet the water was barely drinkable and was
impregnated with sulfur and alkali. 67 For some army travelers, their desert
surroundings became almost too much to endure. Katherine Cochran, an
officer's wife, wrote, "From the cold, bracing climate of Oregon we found
ourselves in a few weeks on the arid deserts of Arizona, breathing and almost
stifling in the dust that was thrown into the ambulance by the wind that always
seemed to blow in the wrong direction.T"
In several army discourses, the journey was represented as a battle against a
"hostile" environment. The civilized army travelers contended that they were
at the mercy of an uncontroliable nature, plagued not only by the "terrible"
Apaches but by an arsenal of natural dangers and hardships. In addition to the
crushing heat and chronic shortage of water, "dreadful" sandstorms terrified,
"blinded and choked the men and mules," and made "traveling impossible."?
Even rain, although rare, was presented as dangerous. Torrents soaked the
travelers, destroyed their belongings, and washed out the roads. Quicksand
and whirlpools in the Colorado River awaited any soldier unlucky enough
to fall overboard from a steamer or a flatboat." Furthermore, all vegetation
seemed armed with thorns and prongs. Cranston described the terrain from
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Yuma to Tucson as "just one stream of snakes," and claimed the soldiers
killed between five and thirty per day." Mirages added to the travelers' misery.
According to Julia Davis, heavenly but false images of ships at sea, bustling
towns, and cool lakes only "made the heat hotter, and the desert drier, and
the sand more choking than ever.?"
There are several similarities between the travel narratives penned by
army people and those written by white civilian travelers in the Southwest.
Admittedly, some civilian boosters painted the Southwest as a land of milk
and honey, while whites who married Hispanic and Native American women
generally displayed a greater understanding of local inhabitants. Similarly,
a few civilian travelers seemed more willing to praise "the picturesque and
romantic" qualities of the southwestern landscapes than the majority of
army writers. Many civilians, however, tended to affirm the view of military
travelers and considered the region to be profoundly different from the "real"
United States. They wrote of barren and inhospitable landscapes and noted
that material conditions were miserable in the "mud towns." Nonmilitary
Anglos also cited their prejudices against Mexicans, homogenizing the
local population as ignorant, immoral, and uncivilized. J. Ross Browne, a
journalist who resided in Oakland, California, argued that the Southwest
was "completely isolated from the civilized world ... more distant from San
Francisco and New Yorkthan either of those cities is from China or Norway."
A correspondent covering the U.S.-Apache conflicts for the Chicago Times
in 1881 commented on the "repulsive-looking" adobe structures and the
"very unpleasant" local people he encountered in Arizona. According to
historian Deena J. Gonzalez, the "images and accounts" of white travelers
and newcomers "exhibited condescension and an implied, if not outspoken,
sense of superiority.'?' Itseems that many civilians, like army officers, soldiers,
and wives, also often sought to justify U.S. conquest.
In the 1880s, the transcontinental railroad not only made the army trips
easier and shorter than overland or sea travel, but initiated a profound change
in army travelers' representations of their southwestern journeys. From the
west, the Southern Pacific Railroad came to Yuma in 1877 and crossed
Arizona and New Mexico in 1881. From the east, the Atlantic and Pacific
Railroad reached the Colorado River near Fort Mojave in 1883. Penetrating
New Mexico from the north, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad
connected with the Southern Pacific and the Texas and Pacific near El
Paso, at the extreme western corner of Texas, in 1881. This alternative form
of transportation meant that the army no longer forced its troops to march
most of the way to their destinations. One company returning from Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, to the Pacific Coast in 1882 hiked only 200 of its almost
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1,600 travel miles. In 1880 a unit rushing from Indian Territory to join the
Victorio campaign in southern New Mexico was able to do most of its journey
by rail. The rail trip of 1,081 miles took only five days." In 1884 army surgeon
William Henry Corbusier journeyed by rail from New Yorkto Bowie Station
in southeastern Arizona in only six days.Twelve years earlier, his much shorter
trip from Nevada to a central Arizona post had lasted fifty-one days."
Historian David M. Wrobel has written that in their texts many civilian
emigrants drew a stark juxtaposition between travel by wagon and by Pullman
Palace Car. Travelers contrasted the demands of the past with the luxuries
of the present." The same happened with army travelers. Summerhayes
noted, "Remembering the days, weeks, and even months spent in traveling
on the river, or marching through the deserts, I could not make the Pullman
cars seem a reality." Capt. Frank K Upham shared her sentiment: "When I
hear others carelessly mention a trip by rail ... as a journey of few days ...
a momentary feeling akin to envy or anger comes over me, and it is difficult
to realize that it has been possible for even steam and the locomotive to
accomplish such results-to have apparently annihilated the absolute waste
and desolation through which we passed so wearily."? To officers, enlisted
men, and their dependents, railroads symbolized the power of progress and
civilization and the conquest of dangerous lands. The railroads divorced army
personnel and families from the "inhospitable and inferior terrain" they so
eagerly wrote about.
Traveling by train made journeys in the Southwest comfortable, easy,
and pleasant; they were no longer a "struggle." In Pullman cars, officers and
their wives had a better chance to rest, relax, and enjoy pleasant socializing
and leisure. Dust, heat, or lack of water did not regularly disturb travelers,
and they were less likely to be exhausted or frustrated. Officers and families
could avoid contact with lower-class passengers on trains. Furthermore,
army people no longer had to obtain or decorate wagons or worry about
their food supplies or the safe arrival of their material belongings. As a result,
southwestern journeys lost most of their exoticism and "shock value," and
travel to the borderlands became ·"normal" and "uninteresting." In fact few
army-related authors wrote in length about their journeys to the Southwest
during the railroad era.
Before the advent of the transcontinental railroad, the journeys of army
personnel in the West were characterized by a sense of frustration and
struggle and by the construction of difference. First, a strong class division
distinguished the travel experiences of officers and their wives from those
of enlisted men. Most officers and wives shared a desire to differentiate
themselves from the enlisted men, to ensure that their journeys would fulfill
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certain class standards, and to display their collective status and level of
refinement. Uncertain about what to expect, many first-time travelers hoped
to enjoy their time on the road, and, to this end, sought to secure good travel
accommodations, an abundant supply of material comforts, and the help
of lower-class servants. In contrast the army's underclass, the enlisted men,
traveled almost empty handed, had no servants, and consumed a poor diet.
They resented marching over rugged terrain, occupying second-class facilities
on boats and trains, and being reduced to servant status by their officers and
the officers' wives.
Second, officers and wives were often disappointed to travel in a level of
style and comfort far below the standard they considered appropriate for their
class position. The gap between travelers' expectations and the realities of
travel conditions and methods in the Southwest caused them to feel disgust
towards their surroundings, and even to resent the whole journey. Arduous
weeks and months spent on the road took their toll on officers and their wives.
Upholding high standards of personal appearance and engaging in social
activities befitting their class became difficult as travelers grew frustrated and
fatigued. Even first-class accommodations in boats and decorated wagons
inadequately sheltered officers and dependents from the heat and dust.
Material wealth and servants were paltry compensation when the food was
judged poor and the water supply was uncertain, when resting places were
miserable, when traveling in the "barren" desert surrounded by seemingly
dangerous Apaches and vicious rattlesnakes, or when one was seasick and
stuck for days in a boat hit by crushing heat. Also, officers and their wives
could not haul all the luxury items they would have wanted, which made
them more bitter and miserable.
Third, journeys functioned as sites in the production of army power.
Army discourses constructed pre-railroad journeys as a transition from the
known world to the unknown, a descent into a region outside the nation and
civilization in its contemporary condition. By representing the journey not
as an unjust penetration of other peoples' lands, but as a struggle and a rite
of passage that tested the travelers resolve and made them (successfully) face
the "savage Indian danger" and "dangerous environment," officers and their
wives celebrated their character and perseverance as a superior group who
pushed through all colonial obstacles. These agents of empire were unwanted
by and irrelevant to society in the eastern United States. Thus, they sought to
make themselves heroic and nationally important by penetrating "dangerous"
and "unwelcorning" regions, and opening them to civilization. They also
accrued colonial authority and constructed their identity by elaborating on the
difference, or constructing even binary opposition, between themselves and
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the environment, settlements, and peoples they encountered. While traveling
through sections of the Southwest, the army's "imperial eyes" deemed the
region foreign, inferior, and undeveloped-the antithesis of civilization.
In that state, the region offered little to army travelers except immoral and
uncivilized societies and untamed and unused nature: hot, sandy, dusty, arid,
depraved, stagnant, and empty.
Although it initially appears that critical white army travelers dismissed,
or at least seriously questioned, the potential of the southwestern terrain
for white settlement and industry, there is another side to this appraisal of
the Southwest. As lands devoid of proper civilization, these places were
also considered ripe for the taking and readily available for liberation and
regeneration by civilized forces. By portraying the Southwest as a land of
inferior societies and empty places in their writings, army travelers justified
U.S. conquest as right and just, and even preferable to leaving the region to
the local Indian or Hispanic population.
Difference was central to colonial power. Mter railroad companies
laid tracks across the Southwest, army travelers no longer differentiated
themselves from the region they were traversing, which radically altered the
significance and meaning they assigned to their journeys. The railroads, a
symbol of civilization, established colonizer control over the travel terrain so
that journeys were no longer represented as struggles, and the environment
ceased to be "dangerous" or "inferior." When the journeys became "normal,"
they lost much of their appeal in army eyes and became largely irrelevant as
a source for colonizer empowerment.
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